Johann Salomo Semler's distinction between public and private religion has central significance for the theory of Christianity, particularly as this is conceived by Trutz Rendtorff. It serves the theory as a conceptual tool in order to be able to grasp the sociological problem of relating individual and society theologically and thus to describe modernity as a „chapter in the history of Christianity.“ Yet certain difficulties arise upon closer viewing. In Semler the distinction rests on the effort to set a free (...) private religion apart from public religion. In this it is indebted to a pointedly critical interest and can thus not be enlisted in support of a constructive definition of the relationship between church and Christianity. As a result, it becomes difficult to claim that the theory of Christianity can be based upon the period of theological enlightenment. Instead, it is tempting to take up the critical starting impulse of Semler's distinction and interpret it as a figural reflection with which theology reflects its relation to its own subject matter. The distinction of public and private religion thus finally moves surprisingly close to a systems-theoretical version of the relationship between individual and society. (shrink)

In 2018 On My Own Publications was published as volume 82 of Heidegger’s collected works. Its content includes roughly 400 pages in which Heidegger himself reflects on Being and Time. A central theme in these pages, and the one to which this article is devoted, is Heidegger’s criticism of the way that the question of Being (Seinsfrage) is conceived there as the question of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnisfrage). More specifically, the author aims to demonstrate the importance of these criticisms (...) – which include matters of both style and content – for understanding Being and Time itself and the general development of Heidegger’s thought. Though many critics already seized on what they took to be the inadequacy of starting with the understanding of Being, we can now see in detail how Heidegger himself conceived its inadequacy and how he specifically sought to address it in his later thought. (shrink)

I argue that one of the central concepts of the second part of Being and Time – resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) – represents a new way of doing philosophy and should therefore be understood as a philosophical method. Resoluteness is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things and is methodologically necessary to uncover these things as what they are. I draw on insights from the recently published On My Own Publications, in which Heidegger points to resoluteness as a crucial step towards (...) his later methodological stance. In doing so, I illuminate important aspects of Being and Time and contribute to ongoing debates about Heidegger’s philosophical method. I demonstrate that it is Heidegger’s critique of transcendental philosophy and of the inquiry into possibility conditions that is meant to be overcome by developing the idea of resoluteness as a philosophical method. (shrink)

Spacetime as we know and love it is lost in most approaches to quantum gravity. For many of these approaches, as inchoate and incomplete as they may be, one of the main challenges is to relate what they take to be the fundamental non-spatiotemporal structure of the world back to the classical spacetime of GR. The present essay investigates how spacetime is lost and how it may be regained in one major approach to quantum gravity, loop quantum gravity.

The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

Several initiatives recognize the importance of transforming institutions, not just changing individuals, to diversify STEM fields. Universities and colleges are distinctive gendered work organizations because workers are highly educated and have authority in hiring, evaluation, and policy. This article explores whether feminist sociologists are particularly well suited to guide institutional change to diversify the academy. Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with 24 feminist academic sociologists at the rank of associate or full professor, I analyze how their feminist and sociological (...) identities intersect with institutional locations to create opportunities to transform the academy. Outsiders within, feminist sociologists revise and use the master’s tools to produce knowledge that improves recognition of, and ability to reduce, structural inequalities. Proficiency with these tools confers insider legitimacy and access to a “seat at the table” where disciplinary expertise and political commitments contribute to institutional change. Inevitably, these professors confront resistance, and in response develop strategies to advance their goals. Insights from feminist sociologists suggest that to transform universities to reflect the diversity of institutions and lived reality of contemporary faculty, it may be more useful to identify a set of commitments and principles that inform policies and practices, rather than specifying actions to support culture change. (shrink)

_Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism_ fundamentally rethinks the nature of the transgressive theories and practices of the Buddhist Tantric traditions, challenging the notion that the Tantras were "marginal" or primitive and situating them instead--both ideologically and institutionally--within larger trends in mainstream Buddhist and Indian culture. Critically surveying prior scholarship, Wedemeyer exposes the fallacies of attributing Tantric transgression to either the passions of lusty monks, primitive tribal rites, or slavish imitation of Saiva traditions. Through comparative analysis of modern historical narratives--that depict (...) Tantrism as a degenerate form of Buddhism, a primal religious undercurrent, or medieval ritualism--he likewise demonstrates these to be stock patterns in the European historical imagination. Through close analysis of primary sources, Wedemeyer reveals the lived world of Tantric Buddhism as largely continuous with the Indian religious mainstream and deploys contemporary methods of semiotic and structural analysis to make sense of its seemingly repellent and immoral injunctions. Innovative, semiological readings of the influential _Guhyasamaja Tantra_ underscore the text's overriding concern with purity, pollution, and transcendent insight--issues shared by all Indic religions--and a large-scale, quantitative study of Tantric literature shows its radical antinomianism to be a highly managed ritual observance restricted to a sacerdotal elite. These insights into Tantric scripture and ritual clarify the continuities between South Asian Tantrism and broader currents in Indian religion, illustrating how thoroughly these "radical" communities were integrated into the intellectual, institutional, and social structures of South Asian Buddhism. (shrink)

_Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism_ fundamentally rethinks the nature of the transgressive theories and practices of the Buddhist Tantric traditions, challenging the notion that the Tantras were "marginal" or primitive and situating them instead -- both ideologically and institutionally -- within larger trends in mainstream Buddhist and Indian culture. Critically surveying prior scholarship, Wedemeyer exposes the fallacies of attributing Tantric transgression to either the passions of lusty monks, primitive tribal rites, or slavish imitation of Saiva traditions. Through comparative analysis of (...) modern historical narratives -- that depict Tantrism as a degenerate form of Buddhism, a primal religious undercurrent, or medieval ritualism -- he likewise demonstrates these to be stock patterns in the European historical imagination. Through close analysis of primary sources, Wedemeyer reveals the lived world of Tantric Buddhism as largely continuous with the Indian religious mainstream and deploys contemporary methods of semiotic and structural analysis to make sense of its seemingly repellent and immoral injunctions. Innovative, semiological readings of the influential _Guhyasamaja Tantra_ underscore the text's overriding concern with purity, pollution, and transcendent insight -- issues shared by all Indic religions -- and a large-scale, quantitative study of Tantric literature shows its radical antinomianism to be a highly managed ritual observance restricted to a sacerdotal elite. These insights into Tantric scripture and ritual clarify the continuities between South Asian Tantrism and broader currents in Indian religion, illustrating how thoroughly these "radical" communities were integrated into the intellectual, institutional, and social structures of South Asian Buddhism. (shrink)

The text introduces the concept behind the Proceedings of the 2018 ZiF Workshop “Studying Migration Policies at the Interface between Empirical Research and Normative Analysis”. It explains why there is a need to study migration policies across disciplines, includes a short note on the current literature, and provides a look back at the workshop. DOI:10.17879/15199624685 .

De differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis -- Monitum ad commentationem luculentam de differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis.

Mémoire de Mons. Lange contre cette philosophie -- Réponse préliminaire d'un auteur anonimeà ce mémoire -- Sommaire de la réponse de Mr. Wolf mȩme avec un avis au lecteur de l'histoire de ce nouveau différend.

This is a chapter of the planned monograph "Out of Nowhere: The Emergence of Spacetime in Quantum Theories of Gravity", co-authored by Nick Huggett and Christian Wüthrich and under contract with Oxford University Press. (More information at www<dot>beyondspacetime<dot>net.) This chapter introduces causal set theory and identifies and articulates a 'problem of space' in this theory.

AI’s new ability to create artworks is seen as a major challenge to today’s understanding of art. There is a strong tension between people who predict that AI will replace artists and critics who claim that AI art will never be art. Furthermore, recent studies have documented a negative bias towards AI art. This paper provides a philosophical explanation for this negative bias, based on our shared understanding of the ontological differences between objects. We argue that our perception of art (...) depends on our understanding of the context of its creation: human-made art is experienced as an interplay between the artist and nature. In AI-generated art, this interplay is either absent or minimised. We conclude that the displacement of the “human factor” in art will not lead to an evolution of art, but to the end of art. (shrink)

Heidegger’s criticism of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl is primarily leveled at its underlying understanding of the transcendental subject. Heidegger argues that in order to give an adequate account of the intelligibility of the world, the transcendental subject must be factical. By discussing central aspects of Heidegger’s criticism, this paper shows that his notion of a factical transcendental subject is a necessary step out of aporias of transcendental philosophy. I argue that Heidegger’s emphasis on the facticity of the (...) human being must be understood not as an abandonment of the transcendental standpoint, but as a radicalization of its central ideas. Heidegger is thereby transforming transcendental philosophy into a transcendental ontology. I demonstrate that this allows Heidegger to reconceptualize the constitution of the world as social and historical without having to jettison the role of the transcendental subject. (shrink)

The function of the formal indication is the mediation between concept and thing. This mediation is the concretization of the concept. I show that the formality of formal indications is the specific generality (Allgemeinheitscharakter) of philosophical concepts. This formality is their principality (Prinzipialität). Accordingly, a formally indicating concept would be a concept which gives the direction for the concretion as principally as possible. A principality which secures the repeatability and comprehensibility of philosophical insights. Looking at Heidegger’s lecture of the winter (...) semester 1921/22, it is shown that 1) Heidegger understands the principality as the Being of beings, 2) that philosophical language is about the mediation between the principality of concepts and the concreteness of things; and 3) that this principality is identified with the formality of the formal indication. This early lecture is decisive for Heidegger’s whole philosophy because it lays bare the necessary relation between ontology and philosophy of language. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage a pour but de déterminer qu'il existe bien un rapport entre la mode vestimentaire et la pensée d'un moment. La philosophie néoplatonicienne de la Renaissance, toute occupée à définir le beau, représente un terrain idéal pour étudier le lien entre pensée philosophique et matérialité vestimentaire.

This book gives a systematic account of Martin Heidegger’s methodology. Contrary to the widespread conception that Heidegger’s (late) philosophy is lacking any kind of verifiable, provable insights, the author shows that a rejection of the scientific method does not imply a rejection of methodological, rigorous thinking. In fact, it can be shown that the method of Heidegger’s philosophy is more rigorous, more strict and more radical than the scientific method. But because the scientific method is conceived of as the non-plus-ultra (...) even within philosophy, in order to outline Heidegger’s methodology we have to give an account of his criticism of the scientific method. By showing the limitations of modern science, we can unfold the possibilities of philosophy. -/- The book consists of four parts: The first part is about Heidegger’s concept of subjectivity and his criticism of the Cartesian subject-object-dichotomy. The main argument of the first part is that the ‘subject’, inasmuch as it is understood ontologically, is essential for philosophy. We outline this – following Steven G. Crowell – as the philosophical significance of the first-person-perspective (Heidegger’s early philosophy between 1919 and 1927). -/- The second part is about what we call an ontological theory of constitution: A radicalization of the Kantian transcendental philosophy which does not orbit around transcendental subjectivity, but rather around concrete subjectivity (Dasein vs. the transcendental ego). We take a closer look on what Heidegger has written between 1927 and 1930. -/- The third part is about Heidegger’s late philosophy. The main topic of this third part is Heidegger’s “seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung auf das machenschaftliche Wesen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“ – which is in essence a closer look on what modern science is, on its relation to technology, and on its very own historicality. We discuss the most famous published texts and lectures between 1930 and 1976, but focus on Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and his second magnus opus: the Contributions to Philosophy. -/- This criticism of modern science is the stepping stone for the fourth and final part, in which we take all the pieces and put them together by giving a systematic account of Heidegger’s methodology. In this final part we take a step back from Heidegger’s texts (and from his language) and confront Heidegger with the most famous criticism by Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Jürgen Habermas. -/- This allows us to give an account of the central concepts of Heidegger’s methodology: truth, knowledge and validity. We also talk about the status of philosophical concepts and in general: philosophical language, about Heidegger’s theory of philosophical conceptualization, which is known as the method of formal indication and about the possibility of an ontological foundation of modern science and epistemology. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GERMAN------------------------------------------------- -/- Der methodische Status insbesondere der Spätphilosophie Heideggers ist ein Problem: Mit den Mitteln der traditionellen Methodenlehre können die Aussagen dieser Philosophie nicht ausgewiesen und auch nicht begründet werden. Mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und ihrer Methode hat sie nichts mehr gemein. Aber muss dies heißen, dass diese Philosophie ihre Erkenntnisse überhaupt nicht mehr ausweisen kann? -/- Ich habe in dieser Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass auch die späte Philosophie Heideggers Methode hat. Auch wenn Heidegger in fast an den Mythos erinnernder Art und Weise über die Verbergung und das Sich-entziehen des Seyns spricht, handelt es sich um methodisch überprüfbare, ausweisbare Aussagen. Nur wird in Heideggers Methodologie Ernst gemacht mit dem Gedanken, dass die Philosophie eine eigene Methode braucht und sich nicht wie blind an der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft orientieren dürfe. Eine Methode, die sie zum Teil für sich erst entwickeln muss. -/- Die Grundbegriffe dieser ‚neuen Methodologie‘ zu klären, war das Hauptanliegen dieser Arbeit. Es ging um den Wahrheits-, Erkenntnis- und Geltungsanspruch dieser Philosophie. -/- Dafür habe ich einen Blick geworfen insb. auf die frühe Philosophie Heideggers (1. Teil: 1919-1927), auf die wichtigen Texte und Vorträge im Kontext von Sein und Zeit (2. Teil: 1927-1930) und auf die Texte zu Nietzsche, zu den Beiträgen und zu Wissenschaft und Technik (3. Teil: 1930-1976). In einem vierten Teil habe ich die Grundzüge dieser Methodologie skizziert. Ich habe mich dabei an der Kritik von Jürgen Habermas orientiert, der am bekanntesten und am stärksten die These vertreten hat, dass die Spätphilosophie Heideggers irrational sei. Auch hier kam ich zu dem Schluss, dass Heideggers Kritik an dem okzidentalen Rationalismus nicht in die Irrationalität führen muss, wie Habermas nahelegt, sondern dass dadurch ein kritisches Verständnis von Rationalität möglich wird. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Ethik und Technik" verfügbar.

Das Christentum nimmt zur materiellen Kultur eine ambivalente Haltung ein. Einerseits schöpft es sein Selbstverständnis aus der Ablehnung oder Domestizierung idolatrischer Praktiken, andererseits greift es in vielfältiger Weise auf einen Kult der Dinge zurück. In exemplarischen Untersuchungen der christlichen Dingkultur vom Spätmittelalter bis ins 19. Jahrhundert behandelt Laube jene Räume und Praktiken, die ein Nahverhältnis von Mensch und Ding herstellen. Ohne die unmittelbare Anmutung der Dinge sind weder die im Kirchenraum ausgestellten Exotika noch die eklektisch gestalteten Reliquiare in den (...) Heiltumssammlungen denkbar. Die frühmoderne Wissenschaftsauffassung verdichtete sich im Kabinett, wo gesammelte Gegenstände in epiphanischen Momenten des Sehens und Berührens erfahren werden konnten. Weitgehend textunabhängige, sich in Dingen konzentrierende Medienwelten entstanden im Dienst der Erinnerung an Luther, in der Gestalt des pietistischen Wissenstheaters und nicht zuletzt im Programm einer auf christliche Artefakte aufbauenden "Monumentalen Theologie". Von der Reliquie zum Ding ist das Standardwerk über Bedeutung und Wandel auratisch aufgeladener Objekte in der christlichen Kulturgeschichte. (shrink)

Des Herrn Doct. und Prof. Joachim Langens, oder, Der Theologischen Facultaet zu Halle Anmerckungen über des Herrn Hoff-Raths und Professor Christian Wolffens Metaphysicam ... nebst beygefügter Hr. Hoff-R. und Prof. Christian Wolffens gründlicher Antwort -- Herrn D. Joh. Francisci Buddei S.S. Theol. P.P.O. zu Jena Bedencken über die Wolffianische Philosophie, mit Anmerckungen erläutert von Christian Wolffen.

The concept of the periodical (DVjs) when it was founded in 1923 is submitted here to a rereading, with a selective plea for three possibilities of productive development: Geist is reconceived as an activity of »burrowing«, Geistesgeschichte as a history of problems informed by the sociology of culture and of knowledge, and the research library as a problem library.

ZusammenfassungDas Spektrum der dogmatischen Sündenlehre spannt sich zwischen zwei Polen auf: Auf der einen Seite wird bei der individuellen Sündenerfahrung angesetzt, um die verstörende Wirklichkeit des Schuldbewusstseins einzuholen. Exemplarisch dafür kann die Sündenlehre von Julius Müller gelten. Auf der anderen Seite wird der Ausgang bei der Selbstoffenbarung Gottes genommen, um der dem individuellen Sündenbewusstsein gerade unzugänglichen Radikalität der Sünde Rechnung zu tragen. Exemplarisch dafür kann die Sündenlehre von Karl Barth gelten. Bei näherer Betrachtung wird nun deutlich, dass beide Ansätze jeweils (...) ein elementares Grundanliegen der Sündenlehre zur Geltung bringen, das von der anderen Seite nicht eingeholt werden kann. Beide Ansätze sind insofern für sich allein defizitär und auf eine komplementäre Ergänzung angewiesen, ohne diese doch in den eigenen Entwurf integrieren zu können. Das irreduzible Gegenüber der Sündenlehren von Müller und Barth verweist damit auf die Notwendigkeit einer »doppelten Buchführung« in der Dogmatik.SummaryWhen approaching the doctrine of sin there are two standpoints from which one may proceed: the first begins with the individual experience of sin and highlights the unsettling reality of a guilty conscience. Here the conception of Julius Müller can be seen as an example for this approach. The other approach begins with the self-revelation of God; this revelation is understood to account for the radical nature of sin, for without this revelation the full understanding of sin would be inaccessible to the individual consciousness. Here the conception of Karl Barth can be seen as an example for this approach. On closer examination it appears that both conceptions assert an elementary concern of the doctrine of sin, which cannot be recovered by the other conception. Furthermore, when held in isolation from one another, both dispositions appear to be deficient for they depend on a complementary endorsement; however, they cannot integrate this complementary endorsement into their own scheme. The irreducible contrast between the doctrines of Müller and Barth thus implies the need of a »double accounting« in dogmatics. (shrink)